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SIEGEL’S CONTENTS
!e principal interest of Susanna Siegel’s book, !e Contents of Visual Experience, for its 
intended audience will be, I expect, its case for
the Rich Content View, according to which the contents of visual 
experience are richly complex, so are not limited to color, shape, and 
other properties standardly taken to be represented by visual 
experience. (7)
For example (she suggests) someone’s visual experience might represent it as so (to him) that 
John Malkovich is walking by holding a small dog. To her credit, though, Siegel is among the 
few who actually bother to argue that perceptual experience does have representational 
content—in this case, that it is truth-evaluable—liable to be true or false. Before you can 
defend the rich content view, she recognises, you need to defend the ‘content überhaupt view’. 
More o"en, for reasons which escape me, that view is merely taken to be obvious. And, I 
think, as opposed to some others, by ‘perceptual experience’ she really does mean perceptual 
experience, notably, an experience of perceiving (e.g., seeing) such-and-such, and not just some 
internal (presumably neural) state. If I had to take sides in this dispute, I might well feel a pull 
towards Siegel’s view—if such distant counterfactuals are evaluable at all. But I debark from 
this boat a few ports sooner. !ese early legs of the journey will concern me here.
1. Perception’s Objects: In introducing the Rich Content View Siegel puts things in what I 
think is a very revealing way:
Is it already part of your visual experience that John Malkovich is 
walking by, carrying a dog? Or do you just visually experience an array 
of colored shapes bouncing slightly at regular intervals, and 
subsequently judge that it is John Malkovich carrying a dog? More 
generally, we can ask: do you just visually experience arrays of colored 
shapes, variously illuminated, and sometimes moving? Or does visual 
experience involve more complex features, such as personal identity, 
causation, and kinds such as bicycle, keys, and cars? (p. 3)
Just this choice is o#ered repeatedly. (E.g., p. 78.)  Already there are two telltale signs. One is 
the intrusion of ‘that’ into her $rst try at her preferred alternative: ‘that John Malkovich is 
walking by’. Back to that in a moment. !e other is the alternative she o#ers. Either perceptual 
experience has representational content, and moreover rich content in her sense; or what we 
experience is merely shapes, colours, movements (etc.). Whether perceptual experience has 
representational content or not, and if so, whether rich or not, is, from the start, a matter of 
what its objects are—whether, e.g., John Malkovich or not. Or thus acccording to Siegel. !ere 
is no room from her perspective for a view on which what one sees if John Malkovich walks 
by holding a dog is: John Malkovich walking by holding a dog (unless one’s attention was 
diverted at the crucial moment, or all went blurry, or there was excess of glare, or etc.); but 
representational content belongs only to the attitudes one forms in response to this. So, at 
least, for seeing (hallucinations being a di#erent story). What I want to consider in this 
section is what might be wrong with a perspective that does not allow such things—one on 
which, inter alia, if Rich Content were wrong, then what one saw would so-wie-so be di#erent 
than what we all know it to be.
!at tell-tale ‘that’ makes a good beginning. It is a ‘that’ on which Frege commented at 
least twice. I cite:
But then do I not see that this %ower has $ve petals? One can say that, 
but then does not use the word ‘see’ in the sense of mere light-
perception, but means by this a thought or judgement connected with it. 
(1897: 149)
But do we not see that the sun has set? And do we not also see thereby 
that this is true? !at the sun has set is no visible thing like the sun 
itself. !at the sun has set is recognised as true on the basis of sense 
impressions. (1918: 61)
If ‘see’ starts life as a verb of perception, like related words it, seemingly ineluctably, acquires 
uses in recording thought, as in ‘I see your point.’ One sees (where this is something visual) 
what is apt for forming images, what is historical—datable, spatially locatable; for example, 
John before one, John walking, John’s walking. !e sun set over the Douro’s foz. !at it set is 
neither there nor on the sandbar separating sea from river (nor under the table on which I 
write this). It is not the sort of thing to form images. If Pia saw that John was walking, ‘see’ no 
longer speaks of the visual. It is what Pia might also have done in John’s absence, noting the 
mud he tracked on her white rug.
To deny that that John was walking is a visual phenomenon is thus not to deny that what 
Pia saw was John, walking (and thus, of course, his walking). It is not as though once we 
subtract that John was walking from the objects of perception proper, what is le" is just some 
congeries of colours and shapes. What one sees is what was there: John, walking (etc.). !is 
comes out also in the fact that what Pia saw may be John walking whether she realises this or 
not. All could have been a %eeting blur to her. Unknowingly seeing John walking, she may fail 
to see that John was walking. (Or again, failed to appreciate it as walking: ‘You call that 
walking?’)
So at the very least denying perceptual experience representational content is not 
endorsing that all we see are congeries of shapes and colours, or that what we see is anything 
other than what is there—such things as John and his walking. Siegel presents us with a false 
choice. In the fourth of his 17 Kernsätze zur Logik Frege suggests the framework into which to 
$t this point:
A thought always contains something which reaches beyond the 
particular case, by means of which it presents this to consciousness as 
falling under some given generality. ((unknown): Kernsatz 4)
Two pieces are in play here: a thought; and a particular case. A thought represents the 
particular case as bearing a certain relation to a certain generality. If it represents correctly, the 
particular case does bear that relation to that generality. !e idea of a thought (in Frege’s 
sense) can be parsed as follows: the thought is of some particular way for things to be, which it 
presents as being a way things are. It is of, e.g., things being such that John is walking, and 
presents this as one way things are. !at generality intrinsic to all thoughts, its ‘reaching 
beyond the particular case’, is found in this way for things to be, and its way of reaching 
beyond the particular case. In brief, if things are such that John is walking, they could have 
been that way had Pia been in Cleveland at the time instead of Boston, or if John had been 
wearing %ip-%ops instead of brogans—and so on ad inf. For the way for things in question to 
be the one it is is for it to reach as it thus does. Something about it thus determines when a 
particular case would fall under its generality—would bear that indicated relation to it.
What is the the particular case? What is things being such that John is walking? !e 
simplest answer, and that which I will adopt here, is: it is things being as they are. !ings 
being as they are is things being such that John is walking. It achieves this in one of the 
inde$nitely many ways such might be achieved. (Cf. %ip-%ops.) I will say that it instances this 
way for things to be—my name for that relation of which I $rst spoke. What stands on one 
side of it—what has that generality intrinsic to any thought, what gets instanced—I will call 
‘(the) conceptual’. What stands on the other side—what does the instancing—I will call ‘(the) 
nonconceptual’.
Frege’s point now becomes: the objects of perception belong to the nonconceptual. One 
sees, e.g., John’s being as he is. Seeing-that, on the other hand, is a relation to some bit of the 
conceptual. One bears it in recognising that bit as instanced—e.g., the way things are being a 
case of John walking.
Perceptual experience, at least where it is perceiving, is experiencing (witnessing) 
something nonconceptual (things being as they then are, or as much of that as one has in sight 
from his current perspective on the world). Why might one want to deny that that has (a) 
representational content? Consider words. Suppose Pia says, ‘John is walking.’ She might thus 
express some thought. For convenience, call it ‘the thought that John is walking’. Her act of 
saying this—an act of speaking some words—thus has a representational content in the 
meaning of the act. Such sounds could be, might have been, produced in expressing some 
other thought, or none at all. Something in her way of doing what she did selects this one, as 
opposed to the others, as the one expressed. For perceptual experience to have no 
representational content is just for it to lack the means for e#ecting the selecting of this sort 
that would need doing for it to have one.
What matters so far is just that one can perfectly well hold this without commitment to 
anything about the so-called (perceptual) ‘phenomenology’ of experience. Such 
phenomenology lies in what one witnesses, or might, thus in the nonconceptual. If what was 
witnessed is (instances), say, things being such that John is walking the dog, then one 
witnesses no less than John walking the dog, which (normally) looks as John walking the dog 
would look.
So it is if John is walking the dog. But suppose one is illuded or hallucinating. Suppose it 
is for Pia just as though John were walking, though he is not. !en things look to her just as 
they thus would. (Watch John walk to see how this is.) Insofar as the illusion is visual, things 
look that way. !ey do not look to be that way. Vision takes no stands on whether that is how 
things are. Suppose that it is for Pia just as though John were walking, though he nor anyone 
is there at all. !en, perhaps, its being like this for her is itself no visual phenomenon, but a 
phenomenon of thought: it may lie in her taking John to be before her, walking, or in her 
taking just this to be the way things look. Now there is representing with truth-evaluable 
content. But the representer is her. She so represents things to herself. Still no signs of content 
of her (e.g., visual) experience. 
!e point here is grammatical, not phenomenological. !ere is an  unbreachable divide 
between generalities, which are instanced, and history, which does the instancing. If 
perception lacks representational content, that is because generalities are thought’s objects, 
while perception’s are historical.
2. Accuracy: On Siegel’s view, a perceptual experience represents things to be so—e.g., that 
there are peaches on the table. It is correct or incorrect according to whether things are as thus 
represented. She calls this ‘!e Content View’. She does not just assume this, but argues it. She 
o#ers two arguments. !e $rst, the ‘argument from accuracy’, involves these steps:
1. Perceptual experiences can be more or less accurate.
2. So they have accuracy conditions.
3. !ese attach to them as a truth condition would.
4. So an experience has a condition on truth: that things be thus and so. 
So it so represents things.
Siegel stresses that such representing, if it exists, must be accessible to the perceiver. I agree—if 
it exists. She does not actually think that this ‘argument from accuracy’ works. !is leaves its 
purpose somewhat unclear. Still, it merits some comment.
First, ‘represent’ may stand for many notions. Here two are notable. One is of a two-
term relation, the other of a three-term one. !e two term relation is between historical 
episodes or circumstances. !ose bags under Pia’s eyes represent years of living with Sid’s 
snoring. On this notion a bit of history represents whatever is to blame for it. !at club need 
be neither exclusive nor $xed univocally. !ose bags may represent the snoring, but also a 
youthful coup de foudre gone all wrong. Call such a link within the historical ‘e#ect (or e-) 
representing. Generalisations may be licensed. Teetering rocks e-represent wind erosion (as a 
rule, except, e.g., in theme parks, where they do not).
!e three-term relation, representing-as, involves a representer, that which is represented 
as such-and-such, and what it is represented as being. In familiar cases an author $ts into the 
$rst place. So might his vehicle—that by which he makes his representing recognisable (some 
words, say). In general, the second place is occupied by what Frege calls ‘the particular case’—
things being as they are. It may also be occupied by an object (or sequence of them) whose 
being as it is is represented as a case of a thing being thus and so. !e problem for 
representing-as, not arising for e-representing, is selecting an item to occupy this third place. 
!is is what is $t to be the truth-evaluable content of a representing. So representing-as is 
what must concern Siegel. While causal relations will do to identify the represented in e-
representing, the sorts of things which $ll the third place here, as Frege notes, do not 
participate in causal relations at all. !ey are the wrong sort for that. What identi$es the 
represented in e-representing thus does not so much as begin on that task for representing-as. 
Siegel’s problem is thus to identify some way that perceptual experience may stand towards 
such things by which it does approach this.
Now for Siegel’s $rst step. Her aim here is to show that, in general, perceptual 
experiences are, or are liable to be, more or less accurate. !e next step will be: there are 
conditions on such accuracy. Preparatory to the step following, these conditions are going to 
be that what is experienced be thus and so. So, the idea is, these will be conditions on the 
experience’s accuracy of what it is of. So, to continue, if the experience represented what it was 
of as such-and-such, they could be, and naturally would be, conditions on its accuracy, in such 
representing, of what it represented (as something). Now the last idea can be: since the 
experience is anyway held accountable for what it would be if it represented, we can forget the 
conditional If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, … . So it does represent.
!ere are various notions of accuracy. Some are obviously of no use in this sort of case. 
Others may seem more promising. So it is strange that Siegel approaches her $rst step as she 
does. Her method is: she gives (roughly) three examples of (pairs of) perceptual experiences, 
asks us to admit that we have intuitions as to these being more, or less, accurate relative to 
each other, and then asks us, using our intuitions, to go on in the same way. !us is her notion 
of accuracy $xed. It is hard to see how such methodology could work. Suppose we do have the 
intuitions she asks us to have about her examples (as I do not). About what notion of accuracy 
would they be intuitions? So when we got to a novel case of a perceptual experience (as we do 
as we start every day), what should we look for to judge its accuracy?
Here are three notions of accuracy not to her purpose. First, one historical circumstance 
(or type) may be a more or less accurate indicator of another. !e millesime of the banker’s 
champagne may be a more or less accurate indicator of how good his day was. !e relative 
popularity of duvet ratings may be a more or less accurate indicator of energy prices. !e level 
of popcorn consumption at midweek movies may be a more or less accurate indicator of 
unemployment rates. Second, one thing or another may give a more or less accurate 
impression of something. !ose photos Sid shot of the service entrance of the Grand 
Krasnapolsky may give an inaccurate impression of the hotel. Pia’s description of Sid as blonde 
and tanned may give an inaccurate impression of him if it is only his two remaining hairs that 
are blond, and his tan covers wrinkles and a paunch. Vic’s hemming and hawing may give the 
(false) impression that there is something he is reluctant to disclose, where, in fact, he is only 
trying to remember where he is and why. !ird, a lens, or an ampli$er, and so on, may be 
more or less accurate transmitters or reproducers.
Perhaps some of these notions $t some perceptual experiences. But none suit Siegel’s 
purpose. !e accuracy of A as an indicator of B depends on the reliability and $neness of 
grain of their co-occurrence, or co-variation. !e level of mercury in a tube, for example, may 
indicate, more or less accurately, that the temperature is 20°, if it means that, and (more or 
less) exactly that. It can just as well indicate that the temperature is 7° if it means (more or 
less) exactly that. It might just as well indicate that the average piglet litter in Zafra is 6 if it 
reliably co-occurs with that. And if this mercury is now at this height in this tube and it is not 
20°, then this does not so indicate, though perhaps things of its type as a rule do. What we 
have here is e#ect-representing, with that question about truth-evaluable representing which 
it leaves unaddressed: what way is that which is represented represented as being? What is the 
third term in the relation? As for giving accurate impressions, if what did this—Vic’s hemming 
and hawing, e.g.—determined just what impression it, per se, gave—just how things were 
according to it—then perhaps we could get started. But the impression Vic gives you all 
depends on what you know of him, what you have in mind at the moment, and so on. !ere is 
no de$nite way for things to be—again the third term in that relation—determined by Vic’s 
doings as such. As for lenses and ampli$ers, for them to be accurate in the sense they are is for 
them not to distort, in some sense of distortion proper to them. If it is the ampli"er which is to 
be accurate, there is no saying how the world must be for it to be this. Input has a role. And if 
it fails to reproduce Hendrix accurately—that is, distorts him—it as not as though it presents 
him as having done other than he did. It is just does not reproduce sound very well.
Other notions of accuracy may $t some cases of perceiving. Perspective can make it 
hard, or impossible, to see—tell—accurately the relative height of tall buildings in a cityscape. 
In one or another sense of ‘look’, things may look other than they are. If one building looked 
taller than another only when it was, that might count as seeing accurately. But does any 
notion $t which meets Siegel’s (or her argument’s) needs? Here is a reason to think not. For a 
perceptual experience to have a truth condition would be for a third term to be provided, for 
it, for that relation, representing-as, discussed above, to which something—the experience, 
the ‘perceptual system’ which generated it, or something else in the experience—may stand as 
a $rst term. It would be for a generality—some item within the conceptual—to be selected as 
the one under which that experience presents (or brings) the particular case—the 
nonconceptual, here what is seen—as falling. But perception’s role is o#ering awareness of the 
nonconceptual—a role it may $ll, or (sometimes) fail at. Perceptual awareness is of (or, where 
all goes wrong, as though of) just this. It is not awareness of relations between the conceptual 
and the nonconceptual, so not of instancing. As Frege noted more than once, such awareness 
is to be sought in another place. So nothing in perceptual experience so much as begins on 
selecting some item from the conceptual to be the way in it things are represented being. Here, 
perceptual experience and e-representing stand on equal footing. Which is instanced, for 
example, in the fact that if, as in one of Siegel’s examples, the $sh in the $shbowl looks as 
though to the right of the castle, while in fact directly over it, there is nothing to decide 
whether this is to be a case of things being other than as the experience represents them. A"er 
all, the way things are, in this case, is precisely such as so to look when so viewed. Why is this 
not a case of things falling under that generality to whose falling under that experience 
commits?
A $nal note on intuition. Of course, neither $shbowls, nor their appearance, represent. 
Nor does Siegel think so. What is to represent, on her view, is my experience, or experiencing, 
of them. Not how things look, but how they look to me, is what is meant to matter. Which is a 
di#erence which is meant to matter. I have just o#ered a reason to think it does not. I will 
return to this at the end. It is perhaps with such things in mind that Siegel chooses as a 
substantial portion of her limited collection of examples cases of illusion. For example, Pia 
hallucinates an airport (or Logan). In one case she does this in the airport, in another at 
home. We are asked to share the intuition that in the $rst case the hallucination is more 
accurate than in the last. If intuition is what matters here, this suggestion strikes me as bizarre. 
Waiting, bored, in the bar for Pia, Sid doodles on cocktail napkins. He draws a picture of a tall 
man in a top hat, carrying a tomcat under his arm. Amazingly, just then a tall man in a top 
hat, etc., walks by. He looks exactly like the drawing. !e drawing certainly does not depict 
that man accurately. It does not depict him at all. Time passes. One mezcal too many, Sid 
begins to hallucinate: a horned toad jumping onto his knee. By coincidence, a horned toad 
does then so jump. !is is not for the hallucination to be accurate. It is of a horned toad 
jumping, true enough. But it is not of, does not depict, that bit of history, the surroundings of 
Sid’s knee being as they then were. In a di#erent use of ‘representation’, the hallucination 
makes no representations in that regard. It is on a par here with Sid’s cocktail napkin. In the 
hallucination, no particular case is brought under any generality. Such is another face of 
failure to e#ect representing-as.
3. !e Import of Appearing:  In the end Siegel agrees (I think) that the facts about accuracy 
do not quite show what she wants. So she o#ers a second argument, an ‘Argument from 
Appearing’. It begins with this premise:
All visual perceptual experiences present clusters of properties as being 
instantiated. (p. 45)
It ends with this conclusion:
All visual perceptual experiences have content. (Ibid)
!e $ller may make for a sort of validity. But this $rst premise clearly will not do.
!e point of section 1 returns here. Visual experiences, at least where they are seeing, 
are awareness (so far as it extends) of the nonconceptual, things being as they are—that which 
instances generalities, and is not itself a generality to be instanced. Such is the function of 
perception, more generally of perceptual (e.g., visual) capacities. Its evolutionary value, such 
as it is lies here. !ings being as they are instances, is a case of, all sorts of generalities—of 
something, or some things, having whatever properties it, or they, have. !ings being as they 
visibly are is (inter alia) their instancing whatever such generalities are visibly instanced by 
their being as they are. !e function of perception is to allow the perceiver, by drawing on his 
conceptual capacities, to recognise such instancing where it occurs, so far as these capacities 
extend.
Experiencing things being as they are is, ipso facto, experiencing their having whatever 
properties their being as they are is a case of having. It is thus to experience the historical 
instantiating of whatever properties are thus instantiated. Whether there is some determinate 
cluster of such properties is an issue we can leave aside. We can say, if we like, that experience 
presents (better confronts) us with particular instantiatings of properties, if this just means 
that it consists in witnessing some bits of history which are such instantiatings. It does not 
present us with those properties as instantiated, at least if that means presenting (identifying) 
them as (among) those which are instantiated by things being as they are. It does not present 
what does the instancing as that which would instance this or that such generality. It merely 
presents what does the instancing. It makes no representations, nor presentations, as to what 
would instance what.
Siegel moves from her $rst premise to the conclusion that, for an experience E, there is a 
cluster of properties, F, such that “Necessarily: things are the way E presents them only if 
property cluster F is instantiated.” But, in the case of perception, things are as an experience 
presents them just in case they are as they are (or, again, visibly are). For any cluster F, this 
requires F to be instantiated only if things are as they are only if F, and F being instantiated 
ensures that things are as presented only if for F to be instantiated is for things to be as they 
are. But we cannot suppose (nor would Siegel, for that matter) that, while perception has 
representational content, the way it represents things as being is always (no other than) just 
the way things are (or visibly are). We may leave the second argument at this point.
4. Illusions: Siegel thus leaves us with the usual question about the ‘content view’. Why would 
anyone ever think such a thing? Ignoring the distinction between generalities and what 
instances them, or between representing-as and e-representing, perhaps. Or perhaps just in 
catching something going around. If, like Locke, one thought that perception was never of 
things in our surrounding, he might then, with Locke, posit sensed objects which represent 
these. But such brings us only to e-representing. And, in any case, presumably Siegel does not 
mean to be like Locke in these respects.
Still, unworldly objects, Lockean or not, have some role to play in Siegel’s story. No one 
thinks a gold$sh, or its bowl, represents anything as so. Nor does refraction. Nor does the 
bowl’s appearance. Representing-as enters the picture, if at all, in the experiencing of such 
things. So there must be something in the experiencing, other than those things themselves, 
which makes this representing recognisable. Such an ingredient shows up, for Siegel, where 
what we experience is not what surrounds us, or its looks, but merely how things look to us—
e.g. (as she conceives things) in hallucinations, or in experiencing other phenomena, such as 
phosphenes, or, perhaps, a"erimages. (Cf. p. 62)
Such things might serve as vehicles of representing-as, were there but some representer 
whose vehicle they might be. But why think they do bring with them representing-as? Well, in 
one class of cases we speak of hallucinations as of such-and-such—e.g, of an empregada 
bearing a pastrami sandwich. Since it is an hallucination, there is no pastrami-bearing 
empregada for it to be of. So how could it be of such a thing? Compare pictures (of the wall-
hanging sort). Frege asked whether a picture, as bare visible object, could be true, and a leaf or 
a stone not true. (See 1918: ??.) His answer was: a picture could be true only if an intention 
attached to it. ‘Intention’ is, perhaps, not quite le mot juste. But there is what an intention 
might accomplish: to make the picture bear a certain understanding; be to be understood as 
relating to a certain way there is for things to be—e.g., such that Cologne Cathedral has three 
%ying buttresses. !e picture would relate to that way for things to be in this way: it would 
depict things as being that way (what it would be for things so to be). Here, then, we would 
$nd representing-as (though this need not be representing truly or falsely—representing the 
cathedral to be a certain way—and if it were, that it depicted the cathedral as with three %ying 
buttresses would not yet decide how things must be for it to have depicted truly. (It might, e.g., 
just depict a proposed change.)
One might see some hallucinations as following pictures here. !e hallucination would 
be of a pastrami-bearing empragada in relating to a way for things to be—such that an 
emprageda is bearing pastrami. And it would do that, in the absence of any such empregada, in 
things being represented being that way in the relevant experiencing, whether by its object, or, 
perhaps, by its su#erer). As with pictures, this would not per se involve hallucinations in being 
true or false, accurate, or not. I have already given reasons not to see them so involved.
If experiences are involved in such a way with ways for things to be, then just possibly 
some representing-a is going on. It would not follow automatically that it is the experience that 
is doing the representing; nor that its su#erer is being represented to. !ere are other 
candidates. But such issues I will not pursue further here.
Perhaps some hallucinations do work like that. If so, one might point out, with the 
disjunctivist, that what relates experience to a way for things to be where, as in such cases, 
things are not that way (or their being so is not experienced) is not needed for so relating 
them where things are that way; so that, in such cases—ones of perception—there is no reason 
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